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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
	  
1. Problem formulation 
	 In Greek and German newspapers we can point the persistency of a constant conflict in the past few 
years. The German newspapers criticise Greece’s gestion and culture as factors of the financial crisis striking in 
Greece. On the other hand, Greek newspapers blame Angela Merkel and Germany for the austerity plans 
implemented in Greece.  
	 It is to be understood that Greece is indebted to some EU member states that have loaned money, 
one being of course Germany (The Economist 2013). There is a general idea and acceptance in newspapers 
and mass media that the high level of corruption and the irresponsible spending of money inside the country 
has led the country to a financial crisis. The conflict between Greece and Germany can be motivated by these 
two assumptions. To acknowledge this hypothesis, we chose to look at the political and economic history of 
Greece as well as the events that shook the global economy, for example, the Global Financial Crisis (2008), 
further referred as GFC. In this research project we thus aim at studying the relations between the Global 
Financial Crisis and the Greek financial crisis and understanding its consequences on the social actors and 
classes.  
Research Question (RQ): 
“To what extent has the global financial crisis had consequences on austerity plans in Greece?” 
2. Aim of the project 
	 This project aims at pointing that after the 2008 Financial Crisis and the consecutive events that 
followed, rather than a conflict between states we have seen a struggle between classes and a conflict 
between diverse actors. For example, international organizations, financial conglomerates and institutions, and 
people without economic power were caught in the economical consequences, results of the actions of other 
economic actors.  
	 Referring to the “zero-sum game” theory, we can suppose that in the Global Financial Crisis the won 
of some parties was at the extent of others who lost as much. This fact will be argued in the project and we 
want to further analyze if that win-loss scheme applies to the Greek Crisis context. 
	  
3. Greece as a case study 
	 Our project will focus on Greece as it is one of the countries that have suffered the most from austerity 
plans. Greece has been the center of many debates involving civil society rights and the international and 
financial law, supposedly keeping Greek people poor. There has been controversy on whether austerity is fair 
for Greek people and on whether it is actually working. 
4. Structure of the project 
+ Chapter 1: In this part we aim at giving an understanding of the aspects we are going to look at and why. In 
the same chapter, we will also explain our methodological framework. 
+ Chapter 2: As we want to understand the process of the Greek crisis and the increased indebtment it 
implied, we will chronologically study the relations between the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the Greek 
crisis. In our next chapter we will discuss the foundations of the GFC and its impacts. We will look at the 
reactions of some affected states and focus on Greece’s one. 
Tristan BOITEUX - Jonatan USSING !  of !4 25
+ Chapter 3: After the study of the GFC, we will underline its impacts on Greece, focusing not only the GFC 
itself but also explaining the governmental decisions that supposedly contributed to prevent a bigger and more 
dangerous crisis. 
+ Chapter 4: We will thus develop the analysis of our findings in the light of the theories. 
+ Chapter 5: At the end of the project, we will bring up our conclusions, thus answering the research question 
and opening further discussions.  
5. Methodological framework 
	 In this part we are going to discuss the methodological requirements and choices we have made in 
this project. Firstly we are going to introduce and give an overview of our research strategy, the methods we 
have used, the empirical data and the way all these are connected and reflected on the project. We see these 
factors as key characteristics to understand the conclusions we draw. 
Methodology: 
	 Our research question will be answered mainly by a process of induction as we have not given a 
theory or hypothesis that might imply the answer. The process of induction underlines the connections 
between theory and research, with research being the starting point. By this process we explain the answer to 
our research question. It is to be said that  “induction contains a deductive element too” (Bryman 2012: 26). 
This deductive element will be seen in our use of theories in the analysis chapter.  
	 We have chosen to present and use theories while analyzing data. It is our belief that theories can be 
applied directly to our study rather than separate these in different chapters. This decision has also been taken 
because of the reduced scope of pages that the guidelines include. We perceive the role of theories as the 
base our conclusion will rely on. It can be said that we use an iterative approach as we will develop our 
conclusion while studying forward our case. 
Methods: 
	 Our research strategy will be the qualitative research and we are going to use a broad range of 
empirical data such as articles and books. We will also make use of the transcript of the awarded 
documentary movie “Inside Job”. 
	 In order to define relevant theories and definitions in the analysis chapter, we will mainly be using 
books and articles within the areas of international relations and politics, focusing mainly on economics and 
sociology in the global political economy. We will present different theoretical perspectives and will underline 
the parts in which the theory helps us understand the impact of the different events studied. It is our belief that 
all the theoretical perspective of global political economy are relevant to us in the analyze of the GFC and the 
Greek Crisis, but we will focus strongly on the liberal idea, as it is the perspective that has shaped many 
outputs on the global political economy nowadays. As a matter of fact the events studied can be understood 
in the light of these arguments.  
Scope and limitations: 
	 Our project will rely on historical events and situations analyzed as a “social warfare” situation rather 
than analyzed in economic, fiscal and monetary policy terms. 
	 We are not going to analyze the case with economic theories such as neo-keynesianism and 
monetarism. In fact, it is a limitation to the project as many of the economic policies employed in Greece as the 
austerity plans and the rescue packages have some underlying theoretical arguments. The issue of sustainable 
development might also be discussed slightly in the further discussion chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
1. Introduction  
	 The 2008 financial crisis has been caused by a large period of deregulation and liberalization of the 
market in the U.S. which also affected the whole world. One of the first public acknowledgments of this 
process was made by the french bank BNP Paribas, on August 9th. This public announcement stated that the 
bank was going to suspend its trading on three of its investment funds because of the complete evaporation 
of liquid assets on some part of the american market. This led many economists to consider the debt of the 
americans as the starter of the global crisis.  
	 In fact, and even though they are not the only responsible for the crisis, the highly-risky mortgage 
loans called subprimes are considered the factor which created this worldwide event. We have acknowledged 
the idea that the GFC is not a completely unexpected event which no one saw coming. As a consequence, in 
this chapter we will be looking at the economic system in which let the Global Financial Crisis strike and the 
evolution of this system. Therefore we will be looking at factors, “shaping” procedures and events of the 
economic system that weakened the economy before the 2008 GFC. 
2. Structural foundations of the crisis 
a. Shady assets 
	 The creation of complex and shady assets, which is connected to the “securitization chain”, is an 
important factor to take into account. These assets have been a matter in many debates, as for example, the 
one of technology vs. finance. This debate focuses for instance on the arguments in favour of the finance, 
creating growth, rather than technology; and the other way around. Technology after the Cold War and the 
increase in finances and investments resulted in the trading of the so called “derivatives”. There are arguments 
that defend that the creation of “derivatives” did nothing but destabilizing the economy. The derivatives are 
only an example of those “shady assets”(Ferguson 2010). 
	 The Clinton administration in the late 1990’s received a request to regularize the derivative market, 
from the hand of Brooksley Born, former chief of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, an institution 
that watched over the derivative market. This request was rejected. Instead, in December 2000, the Congress 
passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act. It banned the regulation of derivatives (Ibid). The 
Washington Post released in 2008 an article (“What went wrong”) which supports that Alan Greenspan, former 
president of the Federal Reserve tried by all means to prevent any regulation on financial derivatives, which the 
Futures Trading Commission was trying to legislate. Alan Greenspan’s role is also underlined by the Austrian 
school of economics through Greenspan’s decision to lower the interest rate to 1% during one year in the 
USA. This created a lot of loans that made a boom that could not be paid back.  
	 “By the time George W. Bush took office in 2001, the U.S. financial sector was vastly more profitable, 
concentrated, and powerful than ever before. Dominating this industry were five investment banks; Goldman 
Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns – two financial conglomerates; 
Citigroup and JPMorgan – three securities-insurance companies; AIG, MBIA and AMBAC – and three rating 
agencies; Moody’s  Standard. Poor’s and FITCH”  (Ferguson 2010:  01:26:02). 
	 Linking them together resulted in the securitization chain, which also allowed the creation of more 
shady assets. 
b. Securitization 
	 Previous to the creation of the securitization chain, the lenders of money expected the loaners to pay 
them back. As mortgages took a long time to be reimbursed, lenders chose to act carefully. In the new 
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structure lenders sold the loans to investment banks, which combined then a big variety of other loans, such 
as car loans, students loans, credit card debts to create complex derivatives called “Collateralized Debt 
Obligation”, also known as CDOs. The investment banks sold the CDOs to investors, settled around the world 
(The Economist 2013). The investment banks paid rating agencies as the ones stated before for evaluating 
CDOs and a important number of them were given the best investment grade, AAA (Ferguson 2010). 
	 The securitization chain meant that when loaners paid their debts, the money was being transferred to 
investors all over the globe. As a consequence, lenders weren’t worried if the loaner could not pay. Investment 
banks did not care either and as a matter of fact, they made profits  for the more CDOs they sold. The rating 
agencies, which were being paid by investment banks, did not have any liabilities if their ratings were proven to 
be wrong. 
	 As a consequence of the system, the actors in the securitization chain did not care of the quality of 
the loans, but they were concerned about the volume for getting profits out from them. Many of these loans 
were “subprime loans”, which were highly risky loans with the huge probability that they couldn’t be paid back. 
Sometimes, people were given loans for housing for more than 90% of the value of the house, so they would 
not care if they left the house. The subprime loans were mixed with other loans to create CDOs which still got 
the highest rate from the rating agencies. But on top of that, the subprime loans were the loans with the 
highest interest rates and as a consequence the investment banks bet a lot on them. 
	 Hundreds of billions of dollars ran through the securitization chain. Since many people could get a 
mortgage without any standards for paying back, housing prices skyrocketed, causing a bubble, which some 
call “the biggest financial bubble in history” (The economist 2013). 
	 Another important actor was AIG, the world’s largest insurance company. AIG was selling Credit 
Default Swaps to the investors and speculators of CDOs and derivatives. AIG was ensuring that if CDOs and 
derivatives went badly, they would pay back the cost that they had invested. Since Credit Default Swaps 
weren’t regulated either, AIG was not required to keep money aside to cover potential losses. When contracts 
were signed AIG transferred huge amounts of money to their employees. It meant as a consequence, that if 
suddenly the CDOs went bad, AIG could not cover losses. The 400 employees at AIG in the Financial 
Products division made 3.5 billion dollars between 2000 and 2007. Joseph Cassano, the head of AIGFP made 
by himself 315 million dollars (Ferguson 2010).  
	 Investment banks also bet against the CDOs. They were buying securities from AIG, so in case the 
CDOs turned to be bad, they would get money too. This means that investment banks were winning while 
selling low quality CDOs to their clients and they would win if the CDOs turned to be bad; win-win scheme. 
With time, it resulted that investors had lost a lot of money and the investment banks were winning. This of 
course resulted many trials. People also sued many rating agencies too, who replied that their defence was 
based on the idea that the ratings were opinions; not something to rely on, but merely an opinion (Ibid) 
c. During the bubble: 
 “Countrywide Financial, the largest subprime lender, issued 97 billion dollars’ worth of loans. It made over 11 
billion dollars in profits as a result. On Wall Street, annual cash bonuses spiked. Traders and CEOs became 
enormously wealthy during the bubble. Lehman Brothers was a top underwriter of subprime lending; and their 
CEO, Richard Fuld, took home 485 million dollars.”  (Ferguson 2010: 01:32:46.22). 
	 The investment banks were borrowing capital to invest substantially to buy more loans and create 
even more CDOs. The leverage ratio, being the ratio between borrowed money and the bank’s own money, 
increased heavily. On the 28th of April in 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), after a 
meeting to consider leverage limits on the investment banks, allowed investment banks to increase their 
leverage ratio even more (see Appendix 1). 
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d. Lack of Action 
	 Another problem that contributed to the vicious circle of the Global Financial Crisis is the lack of action 
and the inability from many to have an impact on the former system. There were many academics and actors 
that tried to regulate and stop the bubble before there was a collapse of the economy. Examples of these are 
the report of the FBI in 2004 raising warnings about the increase of mortgage fraud and fake supporting loan 
documentation. Raghuram Rajan, the chief economist of the IMF from 2003 to 2007 presented the paper “Has 
Financial Development Made the World Riskier”? in 2005. The paper focuses on the incentive structures that 
resulted to cash bonuses based on rapid profits which, simultaneously did not imply any obligation in case of 
future losses. According to Rajan, these incentives would incite bankers to take more risks and eventually, 
destroy their own firms. These actions put together would result in a financial crisis. Other warnings were Allan 
Sloan’s articles in Fortune Magazine and the Washington Post in 2007 and repeated warnings from the IMF.  
	 These warnings did not stop the crisis nor changed any opinion or decisions of the people in charge, 
meaning the ones who had the possibility to change the way the system was working (Ferguson 2010). 
e. Liberalization 
	 Some also point out the fact that the liberalization and globalization of the market, linked with its 
deregulation made it easier for the crisis to spread worldwide. For instance, from 1998 during the Clinton 
administration, when Citicorp and Travelers merged to form Citigroup, the largest finances company in the 
whole world. The merger violated the Glass-Steagal Act (1933), which was a Law passed after the Great 
Depression, prohibiting banks with consumer deposits from engaging with risky investment banking activities. 
Examples of liberalization concerning banks was the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which cleared the way for 
merges of big banks in the U.S. and cancelled the Glass-Steagal Act. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, has also 
taken the name of the “Citigroup Relief Act”. 
“The financial sector, Wall Street being powerful; having lobbies, having lots of money; step by step, captured 
the political system” (Ferguson 2010:  Nouriel Roubini: 01:16:15). 
3. The Crisis  
	 In 2008 and 2009 there was a huge increase in U.S. foreclosures and the securitization chain 
imploded. Lenders were not able to sell their loans to the investment banks and as many loans did not go as 
“expected”, lenders failed. Consequently, the market of CDOs collapsed and the investment banks could not 
sell loans nor CDOs. On the 7th of September Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, giant lenders, were taken over by 
the Federal Reserve and two days later Lehman Brothers recorded losses of 3.2 billions dollars. On Friday, 
September 12th Lehman Brothers had run out of cash and the entire investment banking system was sinking. 
The stability of the global financial system was in danger and the credit was about to freeze, meaning that 
banks would also run out of cash, and as a consequence nobody would be able to loan money. At the same 
time AIG could not pay for the Credit Default Swaps and thus got bailed out by the Federal Reserve for 160 
billion dollars which means in another way by taxpayers money. From AIG 14 billion dollars went to Goldman 
Sachs. As these transactions happened under the control of Henry Paulson, who was CEO of Goldman Sachs 
and is currently the minister of Treasury. AIG declined to sue the investment bank for fraud. 
	 On the 4th October of 2008, George W. Bush created the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, 
which allowed the Federal Reserve to use up to 700 billion dollars. Even though, global stock markets 
continued to fall and a global recession started.   
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	 The people who destroyed their own companies (Citibank, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, AIG, etc.) 
escaped the wreckage with their earnings saved and as the Bailout and a reelection of CEOs happened, these 
companies handed billions on compensations to these people. Being the CEO of AIG while losing billions of 
dollars, Joseph Cassano was kept as a consultant and earned 1 million dollars per month (Ferguson 2010). It 
is important to note that European banks also had a part to do with the crisis, as they bought American 
securities and borrowed from American money-market funds.  
a. The other side 
	 Foreclosures continued and by 2010, they had reached 6 millions. Exports collapsed, unemployment 
rates in the U.S. and Europe increased, the recession accelerated and the crisis spread worldwide. General 
Motors for example, faced a closeness to bankruptcy because of the decreased volume of sells and as a 
consequence, over 10 million migrant workers in China lost their jobs. Living in such a globalized and 
interconnected world meant that many countries were affected directly (Ferguson 2010). 
b. Reactions to the Global Financial Crisis 
	 The most interesting part after the crisis itself is to study the way it was handled. As the banking 
system and the global financial system ran out of cash the crisis developed, spread and caused a global 
economic shock. It resulted on the failure of some European banks, declining stock indexes and reduction in 
the market value of equities and commodities. As many European Banks failed and the fear of a global 
meltdown in the national economies rose, some governments decided to “rescue” and bailout the banks by 
investing public money (Taylor 2009). 
	 On the other hand, the crisis showed that Europe had internal imbalances too. With the entry in the 
Eurozone, Southern European economies had large national deficits in the first decade while countries in 
northern Europe had large surpluses. The crisis in Europe can be seen as a continuation of the Global 
Financial Crisis by other means and it shook some European banks with debts that could not be paid. For 
example in Spain and Ireland, there was a housing bubble that turned to be fatal to the country's’ economies. 
As the credit froze, a global recession went on and no demand on housing happened, there were empty 
houses that anybody could afford, which meant that a lot of money was spent without getting a profit out of it.  
From this it can be said that there has been a different impact of the GFC in different countries, as many 
countries did not experience a housing bubble as Spain did. In relation to Greece, it is argued that the Greek 
Crisis has been caused by a combination of structural weaknesses in addition to a previous and continued 
problem of deficits and government debt. These weaknesses will be studied in the next chapter. The result 
was mostly the same: private loss from the banks and bailouts from public money (The economist 2013). 
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CHAPTER 3: GREECE AS A CASE STUDY 
1. History of Greek European Integration 
	 In July 1961, Greece signs an integration deal with the European Economic Community. This creates 
a trade union, a political harmonization (finance, agriculture, taxes), free market and the option to join the 
European Community. However, the military “coup” in 1967 starts a period of diplomatic isolation in Europe, 
and puts this deal at stake. Greece has to wait until 1974 and the firsts democratic elections after the end of 
the dictature to be able to re-integrate in the European Council. The newly elected Prime Minister Konstantinos 
Karamanlis supports the adhesion to the european free market.  
	 Greece starts its adhesion negotiations in 1976, and signs a treaty in May 1979, with a integration in 
the European Economic Community in 1981. However, Greece had difficulties to integrate ever since: its GDP 
is only half of the average European one, its unemployment rate and inflation rate are higher too. Thanks to the 
integration, Greece benefited from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), as more than 26% of its active 
population were still working in the primary sector (to compare with the average of 8% in the whole European 
Community). This opening to the free market was an economic challenge, as long as the Greek secondary 
sector was neither developed nor competitive compared to the rest of Europe. This is why a five-years 
transition program was given to the country to reform its economy, for instance adapting its agricultural prices 
in order to integrate the EEC (CVCE).  
	 However, many problems rose, and European integration was hugely debated in the meantime. For 
Andreas Papandreou, who was elected in 1981, this process means “giving the responsibility of decision-
making to foreign powers, who can’t understand the socio-economic change of Greece”. Papandreou 
decided a policy of helping low salaries and pensions during the 1979 energy crisis, which also worsen the 
economic situation of the country (CVCE).  
	 As many banks in the Eurozone experimented debt, and the respective governments decided to 
bailout the banks, Greece found itself in the situation that they could not bailout for the private losses. In the 
9th of May 2010, the concern changed from the private sector to the public sector. It turned out that the 
previous governments had hidden huge fiscal imbalances. Since then It has been said that Greece had 
“cooked” the books of the government deficit. This acknowledgment made the crisis worse as it caused a 
huge trust crisis on the markets. Credit rating agencies immediately downgraded the Greek government debt 
to a non-investment grade (Forbes 2012). 
	 In the 2nd of May, the Eurozone countries, the IMF and the ECB launched a 110 billion with a 5,5% 
interest rate bailout loan to rescue Greece from the government debt and cover its financial needs of 10 
billions to preserve the banking system stability and allow Greece to go back to market financing its budget. 
The bailout loan was made with the condition of implementing austerity measures, some structural reforms 
and privatization of public assets. A year later it was shown that Greece needed a second Bailout worth 130 
billions of dollars while private creditors owning Greek government bonds had to accept extended maturities, 
decreased interest rates and a high value loss (Ibid). The conditions for the loans were being implemented. 
2. Consequences of the global financial crisis  
a. A huge unemployment raise 
The austerity measures were based on two aspects: 
- Economical adjustment by an immediate shock therapy regarding the Greek state budget 
- Structural measures, on a long-term sight.  
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	 This shock therapy consisted in several different decisions. The public deficit had to be no more than 
2,6% of the GDP in 2009, instead of 15,4 in 2009: reducing public spending would contribute up to 64% for 
this, the rest being raising public revenues. To this extent, the Greek government decided to cut into its basic 
spendings: people were fired in the public service, public and private pensions were cut such as public 
investment. It also decided to lower its Ministry’s spendings and the financial help it was giving to social 
security, local collectivities and public education. This was followed by a raise in indirect taxation: the value 
added tax (VAT) was raised from 18% to 23%. Taxes were raised on tobacco, alcohol and energy. In 2011, in 
order to make it up for the lack of revenues (mainly because of the recession and the global inefficiency of the 
tax system), the government adopts new taxes. These were considered particularly unfair by the greeks: 
creation of the “solidarity contribution” on income already taxed in the past, “special real estate tax” collected 
by the electricity provider with threats of interruption of electricity in case of non-payment. On top of that, the 
greek government decided to lower the imposition rate to 5000€ a year: this means taxing income lower than 
the poverty line (Higgins, Matthew; Klitgaard, Thomas (2011). 
	 In effect, these decisions weight mainly heavier on the shoulders of the greeks than the companies. 
The deterioration of public service on top of that made it hard for them not to lower their standard of living. In 
the meantime, most of the direct ressources of the government came from the tax raised, increasing the 
inflation and having many consequences on low-income citizens. Furthermore, it was on them that the raise of 
the price of public services had the most important consequences.  
	 Chronologically, workforce from the public sector and retired workers were the first to be impacted by 
these decisions: in 2010, the purchasing power of the officials dropped up to 21%, the public workforce 
between 21 and 25%, and around 14% for the retired. Youth employed were also impacted by these 
decisions, as far as the recruiting process was frozen and the short-term contracts were cancelled: the youth 
unemployment was around 45% in 2011 (see Appendix 2).  
	 In 2011, few years after the crisis, more than one (22%) in five young people between 15 and 29 years 
old were neither employed nor in education or training (NEET). Young people between 25 and 29 years old are 
30% to be NEETs, one of the highests figures in the countries part of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) just after Turkey. According to the OECD, the youngest population of 
Greece has been hit the hardest by the crisis and its consequences.  
b. The failures of the austerity packages 
In the middle of 2011, when the EU was preparing a new austerity package, many different voices arose 
calling for a different approach. The English liberal newspaper The Economist wrote: “The European Union 
seems to have adopted a new rule: if a plan is not working, stick to it. Despite the thousands protesting in 
Athens, despite the judders in the markets, Europe's leaders have a neat timetable to solve the euro zone's 
problems. Next week Greece is likely to pass a new austerity package.”. Protests and comments from both 
left and right￼-wing politicians called for a change in these measures in order to try different ways to save the 
country’s economy. These calls were completely ignored, and Europe sticked to its non-working plan regarding 
Greece and its economy.  
	 According to the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), the Economic Adjustment 
Programme for Greece could even be considered a worse problem than the ones it tried to solve, as far as 
many key economic indicators show a depreciation. Greece is according to the EESC stuck in a vicious circle 
where austerity brings recession, which then brings austerity, new taxes… Its study shows that the anti-crisis 
methods used in Greece had a direct and indirect impact on employment and the social situation of the 
country. In the meantime, industrial relations, workers and unions are stuck in a new industrial landscape 
completely unfavourable. Nature of the measures and the way they were applied connected with the failure of 
the First Economic Adjustment Program explain why the burden of austerity is so badly split between social 
layers in Greece. Many problems were not solved, especially regarding tax evasion. The bad circle of these 
policies are also defended by John Taylor (2009) in his paper “The financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: 
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an Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong” in which he argues that the responses to the GFC actually 
worsened the situation.  
	 In Greece, a country where shipowners, bankers and the Church (the first property owner of the 
country) do not pay taxes, tax evasion is about 45 billions euros. This number represents nearly 20% of the 
national GDP. In 2012, according to the European Commission, gray economy represented 24% of the GDP 
and a loss of 10 billions euros for the government. It lost 120 billions euros in the 2000 decade because of 
corruption and tax evasion  according to the American Think Tank Global Financial Integrity. Finally, in 2010, 
only 83 citizens registered more than 800 000€ of year income of 7 millions taxpayers. According to the 
European Commission, only ⅓ of the tax audit that had to be performed were actually made. In 2012, 
according to Transparency International, Greece had the worst corruption perception rate of all Europe, nearly 
20 spots behind the second worst, Bulgaria. Transparency International considered these fiscal issues the 
main cause of the crisis. According to the writer of the report from this NGO, corruption is one of the causes of 
the crisis in Greece. It was used to support tax evasion, at about 19 billions euros a year. If the government 
could make this problem drop to 3% of the GDP, Greece would gain around 10 billions euros worth of taxes 
income a year.  
	 Tax evasion in Greece mostly comes from an unfair and inefficient tax system. Moreover, greek 
institutions lack resources, and the political system lacks accountability. Politicians support themselves: no 
senior elected has ever been condemned for corruption in Greece, according to a 2011 report from the 
administration, and less than 2% of the failing officials face disciplinary charges. Defrauding the fiscal system is 
seen by the greeks as a way to make it up for the wrong financial management of the state: it is socially more 
accepted because of the corruption in the elites. This comportment is not politically oriented and can been 
seen in many social layers.  For instance, Greek fiscal institution used satellite pictures to check tax 
declarations in Athens: whereas 324 taxpayers declared having a pool, 16 974 actually had one. Corruption 
and mistrust against the government are in Greece the roots of the problem, even though some efforts were 
made in the past few years. This fiscal problems are also a social problem for Greece. In fact, it creates greater 
gap between social classes. As far as the crisis weakened the economical power of the state, it has to cut 
social budgets like explained above. The consequences of these weight mostly on the lower classes of the 
society, now struggling in the crisis with less government help. The troika did not focused on these problems, 
as if they were ignored. It contributed to the growing social injustice feeling but was not considered by all the 
successive austerity plan (Der Spiegel, 2010).  
c. The cost of austerity on Human Rights 
	 The FIDH (International federation of human rights) made in December 2014 a report on human rights 
after four years of implementation of austerity. It is considered an economical and human disaster. The 
consequences of these decisions are actually even worse than expected according to the FIDH. The right to 
housing and education are damaged, as much as the right to work and the right to access proper health-care. 
On top of striking figures like the ones shown before, the report focuses on explaining these realities. 
According to the report the measures taken to improve the economical situation of Greece are absurd, as long 
as they do not address the structural problems of its economy. The high-unemployment rate does not only 
come from the economic crisis itself. It is also the result of the way this crisis was politically managed. The 
quick and important cuts in the public sector (70 000 between the end of 2012 and the beginning of 2013) 
were decided without any efficient evaluation. On the contrary, they were only made in order to please the 
Troika, and its deals with Greece. The cuts were thus made regardless of any logic. 
	 The FIDH report also shows the unfairness of the cuts, regarding the ministries affected. Health, public 
transports and education were the most affected by the austerity policy. On the other hand, the defence and 
military budget was not: it remains being one of the most important of the NATO countries compared to their 
GDP. Public health however is not: only 5,9% of Greece’s GDP is used for it, when the average is 6,7% in the 
OECD. The report shows that after the first negotiations  in 2010 the government deliberately neglected the 
human and social impact of the cuts.  For instance, when in April 2014 the government decided to aid the 
unemployed, only 110.000 of 1,4 millions unemployed were able to receive unemployment aid. The Greek 
government have not only failed lowering unemployment, they have also failed helping on an economical and 
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social aspect the raising figure of unemployed. Precarity and lack of social protection have raised too for 
workforce, with the lowering of minimum wage, the suppression of working-deals between workers and 
employers, thus giving workforce less power. The protection of Greek workers was lowered for about 15% 
between 2008 and 2013, the second worst after Portugal, according the OECD.  
	 According to the FIDH, the policies of the past years had also consequences on critical human rights 
themselves. Many demonstrations against austerity were repressed, and many arrestations were conducted. 
The FIDH reports “excessive and un-useful use of force against demonstrators during pacific demonstrations, 
including the use of tear gases and beating. These acts are against international conventions and international 
law supported by Greece. Even though these are not completely new, these practices developed after the 
crisis. Police seems to have radicalized against all critics.” 
	 The years of crisis have also changed the situation for immigrants. This is seen through more 
xenophobia, more police violence against them and the impunity criminals had before justice. Golden Dawn, a 
neo-nazi party completely marginalized before the crisis, became more and more important. According to this 
report, “Golden Dawn could never have had such success with the support, even passive, of the authorities, 
mainly the police and the medias”.  Finally, austerity had a huge impact on freedom of press, which results in a 
downgrade in international rankings for Greece: closing of ERT, the public media in 2013, arrestation of 
journalist Kostas Vaxevanis who published the names of 2000 Greeks with a Swiss Bank Account for instance. 
A lot of pressure was also put on every newspaper or journalist criticizing the deals made between the Troika 
and the Greek government.  
3. The state of Greece nowadays 
	 In 2012, Bloomberg released an article focusing on the role played by Goldman Sachs in the 
management of Greek finances. The revelations were made based on the testimony of Christoforos Sardelis, in 
charge of the gestion of the debt between 1999 and 2004, and its successor Spyros Papanicolaou. The debt 
of Greece nearly doubled in 4 years and had to be hid to Greece's european partners. Goldman Sachs thus 
made a swap deal with the government: this means transforming the debt in dollars and yen that Greece had 
into a euro loan with Goldman Sachs. This allowed around 2% of Greek’s national debt to be hidden from its 
national accounts. In order to reimburse the 2,8 billions euro to Goldman Sachs, Greece decided to make 
another swap contract. Unfortunately, Greek leaders were not able to understand the complexity of the 
financial scheme used by the bank: in four years, the debt incurred at Goldman Sachs rose from 2,8 to an 
outrageous 5,1 billion euros. According to the article, Goldman Sachs won at least 600 million euros in this 
financial arrangement.  We thus see that most of what happened to Greece seems to be done at the expense 
of the population. This lead to a huge disappointment against the political elites, the banks and the european 
institutions from the greek people.  
	 Nowadays, in 2015, the Greek situation is worrying. According to the European Commission, 
economic growth should be no more than 0,5% this year, way lower than the 2,5% predictions made few 
months ago. The first minister Alexis Tsipras predicts a growth of 2,9% this year, but the economic situation 
has gone worst ever since the end of 2014. The lack of a clear view on the government projects frightens the 
European Commission, on whether Greece is going to act regarding its creditors. Even if domestic 
consumption, tourism and maritime industry should help the economy, investments are lacking due to a 
deterioration in confidence in the country. On top of that, the public deficit will according to the Commission be 
of 2,1% in 2015, and 2,2% in 2016 whereas three month ago, it was suppose to be an excess deficit.  
	 The IMF has according to the Financial Time threatened to withdraw its economic support if the 
European partners of Greece don’t accept the suppression of a share of its debt. This imply that if nothing 
changes in its economic perspective, Greece is in danger of a financial default. The Greek government is thus 
preparing a referendum on the conditions of a stay in the European Monetary Union.  This is a way for the 
newly elected Syriza party to gain legitimacy. This party is currently under negotiations with the European 
Institutions, to prevent a new set of austerity: lowering the economic helps for pensions, unemployed, the 
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salaries… Syriza believes that there is two points on which the government agrees with the European 
Institutions: none of them will benefit from an exit of the Eurozone by Greece, and the 180% of the GDP greek 
debt is impossible to carry. The government is thus trying to find a solution to lowering this debt without 
deleting it, in order to satisfy the most demanding countries like Germany. The leaders of this government are 
currently still negotiating for that, when the default is considered to happen at the end of May (Wall Street 
Journal).  
	 Many journalists also pointed out the link between the crisis and the rise of extremism in a country, 
using 1930’s in Europe as an example. Whereas after the 2008 crisis, most of the affected electors started to 
replace traditional failing parties with other traditional ones,  as long as the crisis lasts too long, many different 
extremism rose too. Economics at the Credit Suisse said just after the crisis that “the longer the economic 
conjuncture remains dark, the higher will political instability raise”. American bank Citi also fears the rise of  
“NEAP”, new, extremes and alternative parties.  As its analyst underline, this appears mostly in the most 
affected countries, including Greece: far-left party Syriza won the last legislatives with 27% of the votes and 
far-right, neo-nazi party Golden Dawn won 7% of the votes. Economists Kevin O'Rourke, Barry Eichengreen 
and Alan de Broomhead, studied more than 170 elections in Europe between 1919 and 1939. They realise 
that the lower the economic growth is, the higher the probability of a strong far-right, extremist party support 
is. They also came with a strong conclusion on the access of Hitler to power in 1933. According to them, it 
was not caused by the hyperinflation in the country, but mostly by the strong austerity its predecessor Heinrich 
Brüning set, cutting more than 30% of the public spendings, which created recession in Germany. On top of 
that, two German researchers (Ingo Geishecker and Thomas Siedler) also studied the link between economic 
fear and vote in contemporary Germany: for them, workers fearing unemployment are much more likely to vote 
for far-right movements than those who don’t. The political decisions and choices made in Greece thus not 
only have consequences on economic and the well-being of Greeks, but also on the democratic aspect of the 
country itself.  
	 Ever since the legislative elections of January 2015, Syriza is the first political movement at the Greek 
Parliament, with 149 members on 300. Its leader Aléxis Tsípras was designed Prime Minister the same month. 
This party is an ancient coalition of far-left and left- wing parties  founded in 2004 and a member of the Party 
of the European Left.  With 36,3% of the votes, 12 members of the Tsípras government are also members of 
Syriza. This party is described as anti-system and sometimes as populist, even though it is way less radical 
than at its creation. It is also considered as eurosceptic even though it never stated its will to leave the 
Eurozone nor the European Union. Since it accessed power, two different positions are seen in the Eurozone. 
The first is the Eurogroup’s one, who only accept to financially support Greece in exchange of an always 
increasing austerity and more structural reforms mostly in order to deregulate the work market. In fact, 
European authorities state that democratic choices of voters can’t act against European Treaties and the 
payment of the national debt: this means every political choice of the Greek people is linked to the will of 
Europe to prevent an economical or financial blocus. On the other hand, as swiss sociologist Razmig 
Keucheyan pointed out, the Greek government is focused on trying to prevent the disastrous consequences 
on the austerity policy conducted by its predecessors. Syriza seeks to reform the state without targeting the 
people, if it is still possible. The leading party also considers that the will of the voters should not be 
conditioned by the decisions of a foreign-leaded group as the European one. For them, only the newly elected 
parliament and its government have the legitimacy to decide in Greece. These contradictions and challenges 
are also a strong reflected on the dominant position of Germany in the European Union. In fact, Germany 
seeks to prevent any alternative to the decisions made by the Troika. However, its position can also be 
changing: for instance, Angela Merkel’s point of view seems less radical than Wolfgang’s Schäuble’s one (her 
Federal Ministry of Finance). She does not want to assume the risk of an Euroxit. On the same aspects, the 
European Central Bank, a major actor of the decisions made on this subject and whose existence is linked to 
the Eurozone’s one, is against a collapse of the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union.  
	 On the 20th of February, a deal between the Eurogroup and the Greek government was adopted. 
Athens took the responsibility to finish the work of the previous government, including the austerity measures 
and the structural reforms decided by the Troika. In exchange of its efforts, the government will be able to use 
7 billions of credits from the Eurozone. However, Alexis Tsipras negotiated some “flexibilities”, in the cuts to 
equilibrate its national finances.  Then, starting in June, a new negotiation should open on these reforms. The 
conditions accepted by Athens are a failure regarding their primary objectives: no restructuration of the Greek 
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debt is considered and new difficult objectifs will apply starting in 2016. All the Greek internal reforms will still 
be made under the consent and the surveillance of its foreign partners; this means the German had what they 
were looking for, that is to say no important changes in the current financial help program.  However, 
everything is not completely negative for Tsipras. The Greek government gains in autonomy even though it 
remains very little regarding its financial independence, and can prevent a financial disaster as long as the 
Greek banks can still use the European financement mechanism.  Both Greece and the European Union 
managed with these negotiations to buy some time to allow Greek economy not to collapse. However, the 
problem with this deal is that it does not, as many European deals, reach solutions that could satisfy any of the 
parts involved. It is only a deal based on strong compromises, and will probably not solve the inherent problem 
of Greece (or Europe) in the long term.  
CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CRISIS 
1. Economic nationalism 
	 The economic nationalist perspective is linked to the theory of International Relations known as 
realism. This school of thought focuses on the role of the state to shape outcomes in the international political 
economy. Its main argument is that the purpose of any economic interaction is always the same: the 
protection of the national unit. This theory shares the idea that there is a limited amount of wealth in the world 
and that there is a win-loss scheme; when one state wins, another loses. Some might argue that this 
perspective has a limited relevance because of globalization. However, contemporary economic nationalists 
believe that state remains the main actor shaping the global political economy and being the centre of power. 
There is a connection between power and wealth. This school of thought hold two major assumptions. The 
first assumption is that the system is anarchical and the state has to protect its interests. The second 
assumption is that as the state is the main actor in the domestic and international domains, market and 
market relations are strongly affected by political power (O’brien et al. 2013). 
“International political economy is shaped by the actions of rational states and the “global economy reflects the 
interests of the most powerful states” (O’brien et al. 2013: 10).  
	 We thus consider the economic nationalist theory relevant to the extent of the role of the state and the 
relation between power and wealth. In fact, we share the idea that the system is anarchical and acknowledge 
the primary importance of the state. The state has some capabilities to shape domestic and international 
economy, but as the events studied also showed us, this role can be weakened. The U.S. government could 
have taken different theoretical perspectives than liberalism, meaning that the market of derivatives and the 
trade of CDOs could have been regulated. As shown in the studied events, the U.S. as a state and main actor 
shaping economy in its domestic and international output had been challenged by the takeover of power by 
financial conglomerates. The U.S. government has had a long history of academic counselling in economic 
matters that have a tendency to be liberalist, such as Alan Greenspan and Larry Summers. These ideals have 
shaped the output of the government and it gave power to the financial conglomerates. These turned out to 
work in their own interest, not in the interest of the state and the people it represents. As economic nationalists 
see the relation between power and wealth, we can argue that the theory should be revised and look at who 
or what holds wealth. We have learned that financial conglomerates have acquired a lot of wealth both before, 
during, and after the crisis, meaning that they hold political power too. As these financial conglomerates have 
acquired power, it is our assumption that market and market relations are affected by these actors, which are 
not states. As a consequence, these actors are the ones that have an important role shaping the global 
political economy. In relation to Greece and its relative corruption, some actors in the government worked in 
their interest and those of financial conglomerates, for example, Goldman Sachs, rather than in the interest of 
the state. 
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	 It seems however that states can still pursue legitimacy, wealth and power and this is the project 
pursued by Syriza. Syriza can be seen as an entity concerned with regaining the power of the state. Greece 
after the crisis has been affected by austerity plans launched by external sources. Indeed, the former 
government agreed with these terms and it can be argued that they did not have another option. We believe 
that financial conglomerates and powerful actors in the global economy working in their interests were not 
serving those of the greek people nor the state of Greece. According to the win-loss scheme and being critical 
of the former capabilities of the state to regain power, we can see that financial entities won a lot while the 
Greek people lost. 
2. Liberalism and neo-liberalism 
	 In contrast to the economic nationalist perspective, the liberal focuses on a rather broad range of 
actors. The state is not considered a unitary actor and can be influenced by many factors. Liberals see that the 
world system works in interdependence rather than anarchy and states and people can collaborate for mutual 
benefits. As a difference to the realist view, “the pie grows bigger and everyone gains” (O’brien et al. 2013:13), 
rather than some loosing for others to gain. This view holds the idea that protectionism and restriction of 
economic activity was not in the interest of the state as international markets would generate wealth for 
everybody. Today’s global economy is ruled to a large extent by liberal principles such as free trade and 
liberalized money flow. 
	 Nevertheless there are different varieties of liberal thought that have to be taken into account such as 
the one seeing the role of the state vanishing in an emerging unconstrained world dominated by corporations 
(Ohmae 1990). Others, like liberal institutionalists such as Keohane and Nye, emphasize the importance of the 
state while it is entangled in an interdependent scheme of interdependence and international organizations 
(O’brien et al. 2013). 
	 In liberal economic theory, the main actor is the individual and in the analysis of global political 
economy,  the individual desires and preferences shape the framework for behaviours of individuals, 
companies and states (Ibid). Liberals tend to argue that market lies in the centre of economic life and an 
intervention in it is most likely to produce suboptimal outcomes. They also hold the belief on the positive 
function of markets to lead prosperity. The branch of “hyper-liberals” agree that globalization is a positive force 
for the greater good while keynesian-influences liberals sense some undesired consequences, emphasizing 
the need of attention to market reform.  
	 As O’brien and Williams (2013) point out in their book, the Global Financial Crisis reopened the debate 
among liberals and it challenges itself the liberal perspective. We hold the belief that the self-regulation of 
financial firms did not lead to economic efficiency but to some extent it lead to corruption and financial 
collapse. From our research we can see and agree with the liberal theory that states can be influenced by 
many actors. We have seen that the U.S. government had been influenced by powerful financial firms and 
liberal ideas such as deregulation.  
	 As far as Greece is concerned, the construction of European Institutions themselves is also the result 
of a liberal process. The beginning of the economic cooperation lies in the belief that economic development 
can only be achieved with a unique and concurrency free market between all the European national markets. 
Although the founding treaties kept some economic power of decision (for instance, on agriculture) at the state 
level, the first goal of the cooperation is to create a big free common market.  
	 The European Union thus created the European Union's internal market, an economically neoliberal 
project. It is based on the complete suppression of trade barriers between the members and the transfer of 
the commercial policy to the European level, in order to protect a strong competition between all the European 
companies. This common market, based on previous experiment (Zollverein in Germany in the 19th century, 
Benelux in the 20th century for instance), is considered a success on the European scale, but it benefits were 
definitely not the same for each country part in it.  
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	 The liberal aspects of the Internal Market can be seen in the trust put in its own regulation process. 
The effect it is suppose to have is a higher competition thus creating more economies of scale and allowing a 
rise of the way of living in the European Union. This objective was stated in the Treaty, which is constructed on 
4 main liberties: 
1.	 Free circulation of goods 
2.	 Free circulation of services 
3.	 Free circulation of capital, without any financial discrimination  
4.	 Free circulation of people, regardless of their nationality 
	 However, one characteristic of the Community is very important, as negotiations are conducted and 
as public opinion sometimes does not want to help Greece: a common solidarity in the common policies is 
required. We thus see that the European construction is mostly based on the liberalist economic theories. This 
explains why the crisis stroke so hard and why it stroke the economically weakest countries, but also that a 
decision affecting one country, like Greece, is taken regarding the policies of other partners in Europe. On the 
other hand, this was also created to support European countries in trouble in their recovery process, which 
may be the problematic point with Greece nowadays.   
	 According to the theory, states, people and actors can act for mutual benefit but that does not mean 
that they necessarily do. We thus see a conflict inside liberal theory where interdependence is not as powerful 
as personal preferences and wants, and some have more capabilities to shape the global economy than 
others. This can be shown for example in the bailout of the financial conglomerates where CEO’s got 
transferred millions of dollars while the government was using taxpayers money.  This can also be shown in the 
case of Greece where the former government, with help of Goldman Sachs got profits by the future loss of a 
broad range of the population.  
	 In relation to “the pie grows bigger”  and bringing up the “technology vs finances” debate we argue 
that the pie can grow bigger and both technology and finances can work positively to growth, but as it has 
been shown, unregulated finances have caused a difficulty to exactly know how bigger the pie has grown. In 
other words, a distinction has to be made between economy and financing. In the latter, uncontrolled finances 
have caused a lack of accountability of the economy agreeing with Raghuram G. Rajan (2005), that the system 
has caused a more dangerous and unstable economy, or a “fluid pie” rather than a “solid pie”. A less abstract 
explanation of the “fluid-solid pie”, is that uncontrolled finances not related to the real economy can indeed 
make the economy more unstable. Elaborating on this idea, we can also make the distinction between 
markets. While liberalists point out the market as the centre of economic life, we see that there are different 
markets and in the case of the financial market, it is not in the centre of economic life of many people. In the 
case of the global financial crisis, the financial market proved not causing prosperity. 
	 We share thus the idea of liberal institutionalists underlining the importance of the state to regulate and 
not letting the world in hands of strong corporations and international organizations. According to our research 
and analysis, we can see that the U.S. has not implemented this role. The U.S. government has been strongly 
and deeply influenced by liberal ideas and this can be seen in the large amount of liberal academics and actors 
that are involved with the causes of the crisis and are now working for the government, still in the Obama 
administration. Examples of these academics and actors are Larry Summers, Alan Greenspan, Timothy 
Geithner, William C. Dudley, Gary Gensler, some of them having been chief economists of investment banks, 
such as Goldman Sachs during the crisis (Ferguson 2010). 
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3. Neo-Marxism as a critical perspective 
	 Critical theories question the way the world is constructed and stress a need of change, challenging 
established forms of organization. We will be mainly focusing on marxist, and neo-marxist theories as they are 
the most relevant for our topic, rather than feminism, for example.  
	 Marxist theories emphasize the importance of class and their interests rather than state interests. Karl 
Marx acknowledged the constant conflict between workers and capitalists which would only be resolved with 
the workers acquiring more power (O’brien et Al. 2013). Neo-Gramscian theories, result of an evolution of 
Italian marxism, emphasize the role of transnational classes, their ideology and their purpose to understand the 
global economy. These critical theories emphasize the order of oppression within and across societies and the 
constant conflict for justice in waging regarding workers, women and the environment. According to marxist 
theory, the main actor in the global political economy are the classes, rejecting the individualism of liberal 
theory and the collective and cooperative approach of the state-level economic nationalist perspective. Class 
is defined in relation to the structure of production, meaning that there is a difference between the labourer 
selling its labour power and the bourgeoisie buying it. In this scheme, the firm is a mean of exploitation, 
concentration and centralization of capital. In this perspective, the state represents the interests of class rather 
than the character of common interests declared by economic nationalists (Ibid). 
	 Marxist theories of International Political Economy stress that capitalism has some tendencies to 
destabilize and cause conflict in international economic relations. One tendency can be the fierce competition 
of capitalists that normally drives down the workers’ wages. Another tendency is that capitalism leads to 
uneven development, increasing wealth and growth to some at the expense of others, and this can also be 
seen between countries. 
	 It is relevant to point out the Dependency theory, a revision of Marxism that explains the continuous 
poverty of many states. Dependency theory suggests that poor countries had found great obstacles to 
development because of their weakness against the exploitation from developed states. Within this point of 
view, Robert Cox (1987) and Stephen Gill (1993) stressed the role of social coercion and ideology while 
liberalizing and shaping the global political economy. The conflictual structure of global capitalism seems 
inevitable. Within the state, capitalists and workers strive interests and in the international arena this conflict is 
frequently obscure because of state interventionism and nationalism (O’brien et Al. 2013). 
	 The struggle between classes in our topic is evident as there is a dominance from economic elites in 
shaping the global political economy. In relation to this type of analysis, we would like to point out the more 
complex division of classes that can be seen in our project. As the Marxist theory makes a distinction between 
the capitalists and the workers, we can argue that there has come another level in the structure of global 
capitalism. Where a capitalist exploits the working class, there is a scale of capitalists that exploit capitalists 
themselves by shaping the structure of global capitalism. These affect the output of the global political 
economy and can have devastating effects as the Global Financial Crisis and the Greek Crisis shown. This 
kind of capitalists will be further referred as supercapitalists, as described by Robert Reich. Supercapitalists 
not only have capital power as many capitalists do, but they also have the possibility to lend money to 
capitalists and get profits out from them. This is called an investment, and this its consequences can turn out 
badly. Usually, when an economic actor invests money and the investment turns badly, this investor will lose. In 
the Global Financial Crisis, there were many irresponsible investment thanks to irresponsible lending, which by 
the securitization chain created profits even though the investment was not profitable. When the financial 
system collapsed, supercapitalists had made untouchable profits and as the system was at risk, 
supercapitalists had to be rescued and bailed out for the global system not to collapse. As within states there 
is a constant conflict between capitalists and workers, huge transnational firms, specifically financial 
conglomerates and political forces have the power to use capitalism for their benefits, affecting all the other 
classes below them. While employees and CEO’s on Wall Street, Goldman Sachs, AIG and so on have made 
billions of dollars without getting severely affected of the financial crisis caused by them, taxpayers money of all 
the classes have been transferred to deal with the financial crisis. Said in other words, billions of taxes paid in 
the world by workers and capitalists have just been transferred to the supercapitalists. 
	 It can be argued that global capitalism has allowed the emergence of this superclass, which has 
acquired powers to support its interests. Marxist theories explain the role of the state to represent different 
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classes, being the capitalist or the worker. However, the class warfare has grown more complex after the 
establishment of supercapitalists. The U.S. has been a clear example of the representation of interests of this 
superclass. By liberalizing standards and implementing deregulatory policies, the state allowed supercapitalists 
to increase their capital and become even more powerful. 
	 The process of the crisis itself has also been read in a Marxist way. Patrick ARTHUS, the Chief 
Economist of french bank NATIXIS and head of research there, released in 2010 a report using marxist 
positions to read the financial crisis. According to his research, the crisis is the result of many processes. The 
main one is the global excedent of means of production: because of globalisation and investment in 
developing countries, the world has too much means of production, which imply a lower profitability, and thus 
a lower salary for workers to compensate. This creates a vicious circle, lowering the demand and increasing 
the gap between offer and demand. This excess of means of production leads States to compete in the use of 
their own means, by helping the national industries with a huge expansionist monetary policy, creating 
speculation. The accumulation of capital by entrepreneurs thanks to this “euphoria” created lower profits, 
lower salaries, and lower consumption. As a substitute of this vicious circle of low consumption, and thus low 
production, economic agents and states used credit and speculation. We can thus see that the capitalist 
greed, understood as the will to gain more capital for itself, has a responsibility in the crisis. It underlines the 
role played by the states, whether it was on purpose or not. In fact, it is not nowadays possible to say if the 
state was fully aware of the situation and the consequences of its decisions, or had the belief that if 
supercapitalists do great, it would benefit to all the other classes. In a liberal standard they would agree on 
everybody wins when the pie grows bigger, but as shown in the global financial crisis and seeing the effects on 
Greece, it turned out that there is not a strong correlation between the well-being of the supercapitalists and 
the working class. 
	 As a matter of fact, there is the possibility that this scheme can be changed by the role of the state. 
The state, from a critical perspective, has the ability to represent interests from different classes. Many states, 
by bailing out banks and financial institutions for different reasons, enforced the representation of 
supercapitalists. This scheme can be caused because many governments were afraid of a huge economic 
recession, so they decided to bailout financial institutions. In this situation we can underline the case of 
Iceland, where through a referendum for the population, it was decided not to be held accountable for the 
mistakes of the financial conglomerates. In this case and by using a referendum, the state represented the 
interests of the population, and in a large scale, the working class.  
	 As we have pointed out, a huge part of the Marxist theory is based on the class distinction. Is seems 
that the crisis has emphasized a huge gap between these transnational classes, based on the wealth and 
power they have. In 2006, American billionaire Warren Buffet famously said: “There’s class warfare, all right, 
but it’s my class, the rich class, that’s making war, and we’re winning.”. French economist Thomas Piketty, 
writer of Capital in the Twenty-First Century, explains that the class warfare still exists on a worldwide level too. 
He explains that even though they have changed compared to the bourgeoisie-prolétariat opposition of the 
19th century, inequality and injustice are still part of the capitalist world we leave in, despite our hopes for 
democratization and justice. Nowadays, the true regression is the wealth at birth, who are more important than 
meritocratic criteria. According to Piketty, there is now two social classes starting to appear: the one inheriting, 
and the other which is not. Around 50% of the world population inherits nothing, when around 10% inherit at 
least 500 000€, and 40% an average of 100 000€. The problem with these differences is that they are really 
huge compared to what they were after the second world-war, thus preventing many to move the social 
ladder.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION  
1. Answer to the research question 
To what extent has the global financial crisis had consequences on austerity plans in Greece? 
	 Based on our research we can say that the Greek Crisis was caused by many different factors, such 
as the corruption in Greece and the impact of the global financial crisis. While private financial institutions were 
indebted in Greece and a bailout was needed, Greece could not afford to pay it as they had more public deficit 
than expected. In fact, they thus borrowed money from the European Central Bank and got more indebted 
with European states. The decision of Greece to shift private indebtment from financial institutions to public 
debt was a decision made by the state. The EU and Greece agreed to this decision and they spent huge 
amounts of money to bailout the banks.  
	 The Global Financial Crisis has had devastating financial effects in Greece. Indeed the Global Financial 
Crisis had consequences on the finances of Greece. However, in the end, it was the state that decided to 
bailout the banks, be rescued by European partners and agreed to austerity plans. Their effects are various 
and numerous, raising social, political, human, economic and democratic issues. Poverty, political radicalism 
and human rights abuses have highly increased. These are the consequences of a process and decisions, 
such as choosing austerity packages as a condition for an economic and financial help, taken by Greece, the 
Troika and its partners. This recovery process, started 7 years ago, is not over yet.  
2. Further discussion 
	 Regarding our project, we can see that many problems are still to solve. The consequences of the 
2008 global financial crisis are far from being forgotten and nothing important seems to have been made on a 
global level to prevent a new one. In February 2007, a new McKinsey report shows that since 2007, the ratio 
debt/GDP has increased for an average 17%. This does not all the time means a negative perspective for the 
economy. But its consequences highly depends on the capacity of a State to increase its wealth and growth. 
This means that when credit is too easy to get, as it was in Spain before the crisis, investment growth can be 
dangerous and lead to another financial bubble. This is why, in order to prevent another financial crisis on the 
short term, we need to carefully check the use of the borrowed funds.  
	 However, on a more long-term perspective, we can question the neoliberal capitalism the world rely 
on on a more global scale. In fact and since the end of the Cold War, capitalism is considered ineluctable, as if 
it was an economical “end of history”. This means that is has become harder to question its bases and its 
legitimacy ever since. The neoliberalist wave at the end of last century, with the liberalization, deregulation and 
loss of power of states has been broadly accepted by common consciousness. After the end of communism, 
it seems that it has become more and more difficult to criticize capitalism as it is widely applied in its current 
form without being considered radical. Liberalism and its theories have nearly completely won the “ideological 
battle”. We can see that nowadays too: even though the global financial crisis had a huge impact on people 
and populations, the bases of capitalism are not questioned, only the way it is applied in the countries. The 
debate focuses on national, primary issues, without really addressing the global questions (role of finance, non-
connexion of the financial markets with economy, repartition of wealth, ecology…). The main question raised 
by the crisis and its consequences could thus be: after seeing a huge failure in a system we continue to 
believe in, is it now possible to imagine change and reforms? 
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International conflict 
	 Regarding the Greek Crisis there is of course a relation between the Greece’s indebtment with 
European states, which causes an international conflict. Germany and other states wanted Greece to pay 
back the money borrowed which is a solid argument. On the other hand, is an understandable matter that 
greeks have suffered from austerity plans and they try to blame Angela Merkel and the “Troika” for it. From this 
brief analysis we argue that the Greek Crisis in itself is actually an issue of EU and Greece to the extent that 
Greece is indebted to EU countries, but also the issue is much more complex than that. This would be the 
answer we could get from our findings and the analysis conducted with theories of global political economy. 
On a more political aspect, there seems to be also a lack of solidarity between the people in Europe, instead 
than only between the states.  
The role of the state and supercapitalists 
	 The role of the state is crucial to understand how the global political economy is structured. The state 
has the potential to represent public needs, and from a marxist point of view, represents the interests of 
classes. The liberalization of the economy and globalization of capitalism has allowed a new actor to shape the 
global political economy, the supercapitalist. As neo-marxists point out the struggle between classes and the 
representation the state is entangled to, the U.S. being the most powerful country in the world has represented 
this class and impacted the world. As far as Greece and EU are concerned, their decisions could have been 
driven by the fear of the collapse of the financial system. In other words, the state of Greece and the EU have 
decided not to fight against this new superclass. It is impossible to say whether these states (Greece and 
states of the EU) have been representing the interests of this superclass as the U.S. has, mainly because we 
do not have enough data. However, we can still say that did not seem to represent the needs of the working 
class in Greece. We can thus underline that Syriza is a case of “radicalism”  turned against the established 
system.   
	 The Global Financial Crisis is can in a sense thus be considered as a strategical move of financial 
conglomerates and supercapitalists. They made high profits during the bubble which they could have lost 
while their own companies were collapsing. However, states decided to bailout the banks and financial firms 
and are thus as responsible for the absence of change in this type of global political economy.   
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